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The Earned Income Tax Credit subsidizes earnings from both the wage sector and
the self-employment sector. This paper uses tax return data to investigate how the EITC
a®ects the reporting of self-employment income to the IRS. A di®erence-in-di®erence strat-
egy is used, considering three expansions in the EITC and comparing changes across ¯lers
with and without children. The expansions are predicted to increase the reporting of
self-employment income for those in the phase-in region of the EITC and to reduce the
reporting of self-employment income for those in the phase-out region. Among the lowest-
income ¯lers, the 1994 EITC expansion is associated with a signi¯cant increase in the
probability of reporting positive self-employment income, equal to 3.2 percentage points
for unmarried ¯lers and 4.1 percentage points for married ¯lers.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is widely recognized to have increased employment,
particularly among single mothers with low levels of education. For purposes of calculating the
credit, the tax code treats income earned through self-employment in nearly the same way as
income earned through wage sector employment. This paper uses tax return data to investigate
the e®ects of the EITC on the reporting of self-employment income to the IRS.
There are two reasons why the impact of the EITC on self-employment is of interest inde-
pendent of its impact on wage sector employment. First, while overall self-employment rates
have been declining in the long run, sociologists including Edin and Lein (1997) and Venkatesh
(2006) have documented widespread informal self-employment among the poor. Edin and Lein
interview 379 low-income single mothers, ¯nding that 39% of welfare-reliant mothers and 28%
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1of wage-earning mothers supplement their income with \o®-the-books" employment. This sug-
gests the population most a®ected by EITC expansions may have relatively good access to
informal self-employment opportunities. Second, self-employment is widely recognized to o®er
substantial opportunities for misreporting. Unlike wage employment, self-employment has no
third party withholding tax or reporting information to the IRS. Data from the National Re-
search Program of the IRS (2006) show that 57% of self-employment income goes unreported.
The discrepancy between reported and actual self-employment income makes it possible that
reported self-employment will be particularly responsive to tax incentives. Slemrod (1990) sug-
gests a hierarchy of responses to taxation in which \renaming" behaviors (such as reclassifying
some previously unreported income as reported income) are more responsive to a tax change
than are \real" changes in behavior (such as committing more time and e®ort to labor supply).
Figure 1 motivates the analysis of this paper. Using annual cross sections of tax return
data, I plot the percentage of low-income returns reporting positive self-employment income,
comparing the behavior of EITC recipients and non-recipients.1 Increases in EITC generosity
are marked by vertical lines in the ¯gure. The top panel shows information from returns of
unmarried individuals. From 1984 to 1993, self-employment rates are similar for EITC recipients
and non-recipients. After the most recent expansion, the reporting of positive self-employment
income falls for non-recipients and rises dramatically for recipients. This is true even when
I control for an important change in EITC eligibility. The EITC was ¯rst extended to ¯lers
without a child in 1994. Looking at taxpayers who claim both the EITC and a dependent
exemption for a child living at home, a group that should be fairly stable over time, it is
apparent that the reporting of self-employment income increases for EITC recipients relative to
non-recipients. The bottom panel shows information from joint returns of married couples. For
this group, EITC recipients are always more likely to report self-employment income than are
1Speci¯cally, I use the publicly available 1984 - 1998 individual income tax return data provided by the
Statistics of Income division of the IRS. I restrict the sample to returns with positive AGI, on which both real
wage income and real AGI are below $30095. A ¯ling unit with earned income greater than this cuto® would be
ineligible for the EITC in every year of my sample. Further details about the sample de¯nition are in Section
3. My measure of self-employment income is net income reported on Schedule C, Pro¯t or Loss from Business
(Sole Proprietorship).
2non-recipients. The self-employment gap grows slightly following the most recent expansion.
In this paper I document the importance of self-employment income as a source of EITC
payments. While only 13.5% of EITC recipients report self-employment income, approximately
70% of self-employed EITC recipients receive larger credits as a result of their self-employment
income. On average, reported self-employment income increases a ¯ler's EITC payment by
about $650. I also investigate whether three expansions in the EITC, e®ective in tax years 1987,
1991, and 1994, are associated with changes in the reporting of self-employment income. I use
a di®erence-in-di®erence strategy, comparing changes in reported self-employment across those
with and without children. This strategy relies on the greater increases in EITC generosity for
those with children than for those without children. I also use a more parametric speci¯cation
that takes advantage of variation in the incentive to report self-employment income provided by
state-level EITC programs. I ¯nd evidence that the decision to report self-employment income
does in fact respond to the incentives created by the EITC. Those with the lowest levels of
income are signi¯cantly more likely to report self-employment income after the 1994 expansion,
consistent with the higher subsidy rate they faced. This pattern is evident for both married and
unmarried ¯lers, and survives a number of robustness checks. I ¯nd somewhat weaker evidence
of a response to the high marginal tax rates generated by the phase-out region of the EITC.
Unmarried ¯lers with higher levels of income are less likely to report positive self-employment
income after EITC expansions.
There is a substantial empirical literature investigating the labor supply e®ects of the EITC
among single women, including Dickert et al. (1995), Eissa and Liebman (1996), Ellwood
(2000), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). The consensus from this literature is that the EITC
has substantially increased the labor force participation rate of single women, with little e®ect
on hours of work for those already employed. More recently, attention has turned to the e®ects
on labor supply decisions of married individuals. If the primary earner's income is within
the EITC phase-out range, the EITC reduces the net wage of the secondary earner and may
therefore reduce her labor supply. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) show that the EITC expansions
3between 1984 and 1996 increased the participation rate of married men by only 0.2 percentage
points, and reduced the participation rate of married women by 1 percentage point.
Only one previous paper has examined in detail the EITC and self-employment. Joulfaian
and Rider (1996) use audit data from 1988 to investigate how the EITC a®ects tax evasion.
They look separately at sole proprietors (the self-employed) and wage earners. They ¯nd no
evidence that the negative marginal tax rates occurring in the phase-in range of the EITC induce
over-reporting of income for either proprietors or wage earners. The positive and large marginal
tax rates in the phase-out range do lead to understatement of income among proprietors, but
not among wage earners. Even among proprietors, the e®ect is small. Joulfaian and Rider's
simulations suggest that the income understatement of proprietors is about 9% higher due to
the EITC. Unlike Joulfaian and Rider, I consider whether the EITC a®ects the decision to
report self-employment income rather than treating self-employment status as exogenous. I use
more recent data, because EITC expansions have generated bene¯t amounts much larger than
1988 levels. The use of unaudited tax return data means that I am unable to draw conclusions
about compliance.
Although I focus particularly on the EITC, this paper is related to the broader question
of how taxes a®ect self-employment. In the theoretical literature on this question, wage em-
ployment and self-employment di®er in terms of risk and opportunity for tax evasion. Pestieau
and Possen (1991) consider individuals choosing between riskless work in the wage sector and
risky entrepreneurship, where tax evasion is possible only for entrepreneurs. In their model an
increase in the tax rate has an ambiguous e®ect on both the fraction of individuals who choose
entrepreneurship and the fraction of entrepreneurs who choose to evade. Kesselman (1989)
develops a general equilibrium model with a fully compliant \above-ground" sector and a fully
noncompliant \below-ground" sector. Under certain conditions, including a penalty for evasion
that does not change with the tax rate, he shows that an increase in the tax rate can shift
workers into the noncompliant sector. Domar and Musgrave (1944) show that a tax system in
which losses can be used to reduce taxable income makes a risky investment relatively more at-
4tractive, by shifting some risk to the government. Many authors have applied this result to the
self-employment decision, arguing that a more progressive tax system can shift workers into the
relatively risky self-employment sector. On the other hand, Gentry and Hubbard (2000) show
that when loss o®sets are imperfect, a more progressive system can discourage self-employment.
In short, there is disagreement in the theoretical literature about how a change in the tax rate
will a®ect participation in self-employment.
The empirical literature investigating the relationship between tax rates and self-employment
activity, summarized by Schuetze and Bruce (2004), has generated a wide range of estimates.
The earliest work in this area, such as the time series evidence of Long (1982) and Blau (1987)
and cross-sectional evidence of Moore (1983), indicated a positive relationship between federal
marginal tax rates and the level of self-employment participation. Subsequent cross-sectional
studies that have addressed the endogeneity of an individual's tax rate have weakened this
early consensus. Bruce (2000, 2002) relies on exogenous changes in the payroll tax treatment
of self-employment income relative to wage income. He ¯nds that higher relative tax rates on
self-employment income are associated with a higher probability of entry into self-employment
and a lower probability of exit from self-employment. Using the same source of tax variation,
but tax return data rather than survey data, Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008) ¯nd the opposite
pattern; higher relative tax rates on self-employment income are associated with shorter dura-
tion of self-employment spells. Moore (2004) relies on the 1986 and 1993 tax reforms. Neither
reform is shown to have a consistently signi¯cant e®ect on participation in self-employment.
To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the ¯rst to take advantage of EITC-related exoge-
nous tax variation to estimate the relationship between marginal tax rates and self-employment
activity.2
2As mentioned above, Joulfaian and Rider (1996) made use of the 1986 EITC expansion to identify the e®ects
of marginal tax rates on compliance. Cullen and Gordon (2006) estimate the e®ects of various potential tax
reforms, including elimination of the EITC, on risk-taking. They de¯ne risk-taking as reporting self-employment
losses greater than 10% of wage and salary income, reasoning that pro¯ts can arise even from low-risk activities,
but that losses are indicative of having undertaken a risky project. In simulations with 2005 tax law as the
baseline, they show that the overall e®ect of the EITC is to discourage risk-taking.
51 Background on the EITC
Administrative details about the EITC are described by the House Ways and Means Committee
in the annual Green Book publication. Many details of the credit are well-known to economists,
and Hotz and Scholz (2003) provide a thorough summary of research on who takes up the EITC,
how their behaviors have responded to its incentives, and the degree to which they are complying
with the tax law. Here I describe the elements of the EITC most relevant to my analysis of
reported self-employment income.
The EITC is a refundable credit, with its amount determined by a taxpayer's earned income.
Earned income includes wage and salary payments and net income from self-employment.3 If
earned income falls within the phase-in region, the credit amount is equal to the subsidy rate
multiplied by earnings. Over the years I analyze here, the subsidy rate has ranged from a low
of 7.65% (for childless claimants) to a high of 40% (for claimants with two or more children).
The maximum credit is equal to the subsidy rate multiplied by the income cuto® that separates
the phase-in from the plateau region. For ¯lers with children, this cuto® has ranged in nominal
dollars from $5000 in 1984 to $9390 in 1998. As earnings increase across the plateau region,
the credit is constant at the maximum amount. Once earnings rise above the plateau cuto®,
the credit is reduced at the phase-out rate. The beginning of the phase-out range has varied
from $6000 in 1984 to $12260 in 1998, and the end of the phase-out range from $10000 in 1984
to $30095 in 1998.
Although the EITC is generally calculated as a function of earned income, the law does
contain provisions to prevent those with low earnings and large amounts of unearned income
from receiving the credit. Technically, a taxpayer is eligible for the smaller of two credit
amounts. Prior to 1996, these two amounts were the credit corresponding to earned income and
the credit corresponding to adjusted gross income (AGI), a broader income measure. Beginning
in 1996, modi¯ed AGI replaced AGI in this calculation. Modi¯ed AGI is roughly AGI exclusive
3It also includes nontaxable earned income, such as housing and subsistence allowances from the military
and voluntary salary deferrals contributed to certain retirement plans.
6of losses from sales of capital assets and exclusive of some percentage (50% in 1996 and 1997,
75% beginning in 1998) of losses from self-employment. This reduces the possibility that an
individual with wage earnings above the level subsidized by the EITC can use self-employment
losses to become eligible for the credit.4
The structure of the EITC generates di®erent incentives for reporting self-employment in-
come in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out regions. The substitution e®ect of the credit
on self-employment is analogous to the substitution e®ect on labor supply. In the phase-in
region of the credit the payo® to work (either wage employment or self-employment) is higher.
This should lead to increases in both actual and reported self-employment income. There is
no substitution e®ect for those in the plateau region. An additional dollar of earnings does
not change the credit received, and thus the return to self-employment is unchanged. The sub-
stitution e®ect discourages the earning and reporting of self-employment income for those in
the phase-out region. The return to self-employment is lowered because each additional dollar
of earnings reduces the credit received. For anyone initially earning some amount within the
EITC range, disposable income will be higher with the credit than without. The income e®ect
on actual self-employment income will be negative as long as leisure is a normal good. The
income e®ect on reported self-employment income depends on relative risk aversion, as shown
in the tax evasion models of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). In the realistic
case where taxpayers have decreasing risk aversion, higher incomes are associated with greater
evasion, or equivalently with reductions in reported self-employment income. Considering the
combined substitution and income e®ects, the net e®ect should be an increase in reported self-
employment among those initially not working at all, an ambiguous e®ect for those initially
in the phase-in region (but an increase if the substitution e®ect dominates), and a decrease in
reported self-employment for those initially in either the plateau or phase-out region.
The credit has always been designed to give the greatest bene¯t to those with children.
4In my sample, I look for cases in which earned income exclusive of self-employment is greater than the
EITC cuto® while earned income including self-employment losses is below the EITC cuto®. Such cases are
rare, representing 0.36% of EITC recipients in the 1984-1995 period, 0.17% of EITC recipients in 1996 and 1997,
and 0.08% of EITC recipients in 1998.
7Prior to 1994 the credit was only available to taxpayers with \qualifying children," children
who meet relationship, residency, and age tests. A qualifying child must be a taxpayer's own
child, grandchild, step child, or foster child. The child must live with the taxpayer for more
than half of the year, and must be under age 19 (24 if a full-time student) or permanently
disabled. If a child satis¯es these tests for more than one taxpayer, only the taxpayer with the
higher AGI can claim the child.
Filers with self-employment income use the tax return to report both their individual income
tax liability and their Social Security tax liability. The Social Security tax is also known as the
self-employment tax for self-employed individuals and the payroll tax for employees.5 For wage
earners, Social Security tax is computed and withheld by employers. The law distinguishes
between the employee's and employer's share of this tax, although standard tax incidence
analysis suggests that this distinction has no real e®ects. Reporting an additional dollar of
self-employment income can lower a ¯ler's income tax liability (if he is in the phase-in region of
the EITC) but always increases his Social Security tax liability, as long as net self-employment
income exceeds $400.6 Since 1984, the self-employment tax rate has been equal to the sum of
the employee's and employer's payroll tax rates. Beginning in 1990, a self-employed taxpayer
receives a deduction equal to half of the self-employment tax paid. Whether the Social Security
tax is more or less onerous for the self-employed depends on the incidence of the employee and
employer shares of the payroll tax. The standard assumption used by the Congressional Budget
O±ce (2003) in performing distributional analysis of tax changes is that both shares are born
by employees. Importantly for my empirical strategy, the Social Security tax is identical for
those with and without children.
An individual contemplating reporting her self-employment income may face con°icting
5The tax an individual pays is o®set somewhat by the corresponding increase in Social Security bene¯ts.
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) show that this o®set varies with a taxpayer's age, sex, marital status, and income.
6No Social Security tax is owed on self-employment income below $400. Once self-employment income exceeds
$400 tax is owed on the entire amount of income. There is some evidence of bunching just below the $400 cuto®.
I pool data from all years of my sample to sort self-employed taxpayers into bins based on net self-employment
income. Approximately 1.8% report net self-employment income of $351 to $400. This exceeds the share of
returns in any other $50 bin up to $1000. Other bins contain between 0.6% and 1.0% of self-employed ¯lers.
8incentives in the tax and welfare systems. Reporting the income on her tax return will increase
her EITC if she is in the phase-in region, but reporting it to the welfare agency may reduce
her bene¯ts. Throughout this paper, I ignore any potential e®ect of self-employment income
reported to the IRS on welfare bene¯ts.7 One justi¯cation for doing so is that a large majority
of EITC recipients do not receive welfare. Matching CPS data to 1990 tax return data, Liebman
(2000) reports that only 16% of eligible EITC claimants and 3% of ineligible claimants received
welfare. Hill et al. (1999) match state administrative data with tax return data from 1993
and 1994 to estimate EITC participation among welfare recipients, using a sample of AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients from California. They estimate that
21% to 40% of single parent households on or recently on welfare are eligible for the EITC,
and only about half of the eligible actually claimed the credit. The potential for misreporting
provides a second justi¯cation for ignoring interactions between income reported to the IRS and
bene¯ts received from welfare. The amount of income reported to the IRS does not necessarily
match the amount of income reported to a welfare agency. Hill et al. compare two sources
of information on the earnings of welfare recipients, total earnings reported by individuals to
welfare agencies and wages reported by employers to the state unemployment o±ce. They ¯nd
that 55% to 69% of single parent AFDC households with positive income, as shown in the
state unemployment insurance database, underreport income to county welfare authorities. If
easily-veri¯ed wage earnings are frequently misreported, it is reasonable to assume that self-
reported self-employment earnings are misreported as well. An individual's welfare bene¯ts
will be una®ected by changes in self-employment income if the welfare agency is unaware of the
self-employment income.
In addition to the federal EITC, several states o®er similar tax credits conditional on earned
income. Rhode Island became the ¯rst state to do so in 1986, introducing a non-refundable
state EITC equal to 25% of a ¯ler's federal EITC. As of 1998, ten states had such programs.8
7Since 1991, EITC payments themselves are not classi¯ed as income for purposes of calculating bene¯ts from
welfare, Medicaid, food stamps, and other means-tested programs.
8These states are Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
9These programs essentially exaggerate the marginal tax rates facing low income individuals,
increasing the subsidy rate in the phase-in region and increasing the e®ective tax rate in the
phase-out region. In some cases the additional state-level incentive is small. For example,
Iowa's state EITC is only 6.5% of the federal EITC. The most generous state EITC program
is Wisconsin's, with a state credit equal to 43% of the federal credit for ¯lers with two or more
children.
2 Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy relies on exogenous variation in the payo® to reporting self-employment
income that comes from three statutory expansions of the EITC. These expansions were passed
in 1986, 1990, and 1993 and were ¯rst e®ective in tax years 1987, 1991, and 1994. I use data
for years 1984 to 1998 and divide these years into four periods. The ¯rst, years 1984 to 1986,
corresponds to low EITC bene¯ts. The maximum phase-in rate was 11%. The credit was
expanded in 1986. In the second period I consider, 1987 to 1990, the phase-in rate was 14%.
The third period, years 1991 to 1993, re°ects expansions passed by Congress in 1990 and then
gradually phased in. By 1993, the phase-in rate was 18.5% for those with one child and 19.5%
for those with two or more children. The fourth period consists of the ¯ve years after the most
recent EITC expansion, years 1994 to 1998. In this time period the maximum phase-in rate
was 34% for those with one child, 40% for those with multiple children, and 7.65% for those
with no children. Additional information about the size of the credit in each time period is
shown in Table 1.
Each EITC expansion changed the tax implications of reporting self-employment income,
and changed these tax implications di®erently for those with and without children. I have used
the NBER's tax calculator, TAXSIM, to compute how a ¯ler's tax liability would change if
she reported $500 of (real) self-employment income, starting at various levels of wage income.9
9For details on the tax calculator, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993). TAXSIM does not distinguish between
wage and self-employment income, so the actual procedure used in these calculations involved increasing wage
10Reporting self-employment income lowers tax liability (equivalently, increases the refundable
credit amount) for those in the phase-in region and increases tax liability for those in the
phase-out region. Each successive expansion of the EITC has magni¯ed these e®ects.
Using the TAXSIM-calculated change in tax liability from reporting $500 of self-employment
income, in Figure 2 I plot the di®erence between this value for an unmarried ¯ler with a
dependent child and for an unmarried ¯ler with no dependents.10 Wage and salary income
exclusive of self-employment is graphed along the horizontal axis. The di®erence between ¯lers
with and without children in the payo® to reporting self-employment income is graphed along
the vertical axis. Negative dollar amounts indicate reductions in tax liability. I consider four
years, one in each of the four periods used in my di®erence-in-di®erence analysis. All dollar
amounts are in real 1998 dollars. The vertical lines at real wage incomes of $9000 and $14000
represent the points at which I divide my sample into di®erent groups for the empirical analysis.
The di®erences shown in Figure 2 motivate my empirical strategy. At the lowest incomes, the
tax implications of reporting self-employment income are always more favorable for those with
children than for childless ¯lers, and the advantage enjoyed by ¯lers with children grows over
time. For example, by reporting $500 of self-employment income a 1985 ¯ler with $3000 in wage
income and one dependent will reduce his tax liability by $55 more than an otherwise identical
¯ler with no dependents. In 1996, the ¯ler with one dependent will lower his liability by $132
more than an otherwise identical childless ¯ler. At real incomes of $14000 and higher, the
situation is reversed. Reporting self-employment income is more costly for ¯lers with children,
and grows relatively more costly with each EITC expansion.11
I begin with a standard di®erence-in-di®erence framework, comparing changes in self-employment
rates among the treatment group (those with children) to changes among the control group
and salary income by the real equivalent of $500.
10I assume that an unmarried ¯ler with a dependent child uses head of household ¯ling status and that an
unmarried ¯ler with no dependents uses single ¯ling status.
11A similar ¯gure for those who are married and ¯ling jointly is available upon request. It shows the same
pattern of an increasing incentive for the lowest-income ¯lers with children to report self-employment income,
and an increasing disincentive for higher-income ¯lers with children to report self-employment income.
11(those without children). I estimate probit equations of the following form:
SE = ®0 + ®1Kids + ¯Period + ±(Kids ¢ Period) + °X + ² (1)
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a return reports positive self-employment
income. The variable Kids is a measure of having any EITC qualifying children. The coe±cient
on this term represents the time-invariant di®erence in reported self-employment between those
with and without children. The vector Period includes indicators for observations in the second,
third, and fourth time periods, and Kids¢Period includes the interaction of the time period
dummies with the Kids variable. The coe±cients on the period dummies represent the common
change in self-employment experienced by those with and without children. The coe±cient on
the interaction terms represents the di®erential change in self-employment among those with
children.
In the above equation, the vector X includes state-level variables that are likely to a®ect
self-employment decisions. The ¯rst of these is the state-level annual unemployment rate. As
described by Parker (2004), the unemployment rate could a®ect self-employment rates either
positively or negatively. If individuals are pushed into self-employment upon losing a wage-
sector job, the coe±cient on state unemployment rate will be positive. On the other hand,
the \pull" hypothesis is that a strong economy increases the likelihood of a new business
succeeding, causing self-employment to look more attractive when the unemployment rate is
low. In addition to EITC expansions, a number of other policy reforms of the late 1980s and
1990s changed the work incentives of single mothers relative to single childless women. Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2001) show that EITC expansions and other tax changes explain 62% of the
increase in single mothers' employment between 1984 and 1996, welfare waivers explain about
15%, changes in maximum welfare bene¯t levels account for between 10 and 16%, and Medicaid
expansions explain a negligible part. It is possible that these other policy changes also a®ect
participation in self-employment. Prior to the federal welfare reform of 1996, several states were
12granted waivers to implement welfare policies that di®ered from the standard federal AFDC
program. In particular, many waivers allowed states to provide stronger work incentives for
welfare recipients. I include in X a variable measuring whether a state had a pre-1996 waiver
that included a work requirement provision.12 I expect the coe±cient on this variable to be
negative, given that self-employment generally did not satisfy these work requirements. After
the 1996 reform, states had even greater °exibility in designing their welfare programs, now
known as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), and some states began to count self-
employment as an acceptable type of work activity. I include in X a variable equal to 1 for
post-reform observations from states and years in which self-employment was an acceptable
work activity for TANF purposes.13 I expect the coe±cient on this variable to be positive.
I estimate the above equation separately for those with real wage income under $9000, be-
tween $9000 and $14000, and between $14000 and $30095. These categories correspond roughly
to the three regions of the EITC.14 I expect that EITC expansions will increase reported self-
employment income in the lowest-income group and reduce reported self-employment income
in the highest-income group. I estimate separate regressions for married and unmarried ¯lers.
Although the EITC provisions themselves do not distinguish between married and unmarried
¯lers, the literature on the EITC's labor supply e®ects has tended to study married and un-
married ¯lers separately. That literature suggests that unmarried ¯lers have been much more
responsive to the EITC.
Using the presence of children to de¯ne treatment and control groups assumes that, absent
the EITC expansions, the self-employment rates of ¯lers with and without children would have
12Details on state welfare waivers are provided in GAO (1997). I classify a state as having a work requirement
if quitting a job, turning down a job o®er, or failing to participate in work or work-readiness activities triggers a
reduction or loss of bene¯ts. The GAO reports the year and month of a waiver's approval rather than the date
of its implementation. To account for lag time in implementation, I code a state as having a work requirement
if an approved plan had been in place for more than six months of the year.
13Data on whether self-employment satis¯es a state activity requirement come from the Urban Institute's
Welfare Rules Database.
14The match between constant real dollar cuto®s and EITC regions is not exact because the real values of
the cuto®s between EITC regions varied over time. In real 1998 dollars, the end of the phase-in region for a
¯ler with one qualifying child has ranged from $6630 to $8758. The end of the plateau region has ranged from
$9420 to $13786 and the end of the phase-out region has ranged from $15700 to $26473.
13evolved similarly. Some indirect evidence in support of this assumption comes from Fairlie and
Meyer (2000). In their decomposition of changes in the black-white self-employment gap from
1940 to 1990, they ¯nd that changes in family structure (marital status and the presence of
children) have very little explanatory power. My identi¯cation strategy further assumes that
fertility decisions are exogenous to the EITC. This assumption is supported by two empirical
papers. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) use variation in state EITC programs between
1990 and 1999 to investigate the e®ect of the EITC on ¯rst births. Among nonwhites, greater
EITC bene¯ts are associated with signi¯cantly higher birth rates, but the magnitude of the
e®ect is small. The implied elasticities of birth rates are only 0.02 for unmarried nonwhite
women and 0.06 for married nonwhite women. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (forthcoming)
expand this analysis to higher order births. They ¯nd no e®ect of EITC bene¯t levels on
nonwhite births, and very small reductions in higher order birth rates among whites.
In addition to the di®erence-in-di®erence approach, I estimate a speci¯cation that takes
advantage of additional variation provided by state-level EITC programs and by di®erent rules
for ¯lers with more than one child. Here, I restrict my sample to ¯lers with children. I regress the
dummy for reporting positive self-employment income on the phase-in rate, a linear time trend,
the state unemployment rate, a dummy for having a welfare waiver with a work requirement
prior to 1996, and a dummy for counting self-employment as a work-related activity after 1996.
I do this separately for married and for unmarried ¯lers, for each of three income categories.
An increase in the phase-in rate increases the return to reporting self-employment income. I
expect the coe±cient on the phase-in rate to be positive. As the phase-in rate is most relevant
to those in the phase-in region, I expect results to be strongest for those in the lowest-income
category.
Reported self-employment income can take on positive or negative values. I focus on only
one of these, positive income, because naturally positive and negative income amounts a®ect tax
liability in opposite ways. The structure of the EITC will theoretically discourage the reporting
of negative income in the phase-in region (if the substitution e®ect dominates) and encourage
14it in the phase-out region. Empirically, the share of low income returns reporting negative self-
employment income is much smaller than the share reporting positive self-employment income.
3 Data: Statistics of Income
I use the annual cross sections of tax return data released by the Statistics of Income (SOI) di-
vision of the IRS. The SOI dataset is the best source of information on the types and amounts
of income reported by taxpayers to the IRS. It is a nationally representative strati¯ed sam-
ple of unaudited federal income tax returns, with some information removed or \blurred" to
protect taxpayer con¯dentiality.15 Each year of data includes close to 100,000 records, with
oversampling of high-income returns. Each cross section is drawn from all returns ¯led during
a particular period, including late returns being ¯led for earlier tax years. Because of the blur-
ring process, no record contains the full content of any actual return, and a given record may
contain data from more than one actual return. Although the SOI dataset includes extremely
detailed income information, it lacks even basic demographic information.16 I supplement the
tax return data with data on state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, data on state welfare waivers from the Goverment Accounting O±ce and from the Urban
Institute, and parameters for state-level EITC programs from various state websites.
I impose a number of sample restrictions in order to focus on ¯lers most likely to be a®ected
by the EITC. Recall that a ¯ler receives the smaller of the credit amount based on earnings
and on (modi¯ed) AGI. Thus I restrict my sample to returns with real AGI between $1 and
$30095 and with wage income not exceeding $30095, the maximum amount a ¯ler could earn
and still qualify for the credit in 1998. By choosing upper income bounds expressed in constant
real dollars, I ensure that my sample is not mechanically growing richer over time, but I include
15Certain income amounts are blurred in the following way. Records from each state are sorted by amount of
the item to be blurred, the amount from each three adjacent returns is averaged, and this average replaces the
original amount reported.
16Because I do not know the gender of the tax ¯ler, I am unable to look separately at the responses of
unmarried men and women.
15many returns that are ineligible for the EITC in the earlier years. I drop all late returns.17 I
drop returns with a ¯ling status of married ¯ling separately because these ¯lers are ineligible
for the EITC.18 Finally, because I include state-speci¯c covariates in my regressions, I drop
returns missing state identi¯ers as well as returns ¯led from Puerto Rico, Guam, or the Virgin
Islands.
These restrictions result in a sample of 99,122 joint returns of married couples and 245,321
returns with some other ¯ling status. Weighted descriptive statistics for this sample are shown
in Table 2. Dollar amounts are in real 1998 terms. The ¯rst column describes the sample
as a whole. The next three columns group this sample on the basis of wage income. These
three groups are meant to approximate the three regions of the EITC. One problem with this
approach is that wage income is likely endogenous to tax parameters, and in my empirical
analysis I investigate the robustness of my results to alternative divisions of the sample. The
¯nal three columns describe returns with at least one exemption for a dependent child, the
treatment group in the following analysis.
For the sample as a whole, approximately 19% of unmarried returns and 30% of married
returns claim the EITC. These percentages are low because the real income cuto® for the sample,
$30095, is above the EITC-eligible income in all years of the sample except the last. Rates of
EITC receipt appear low also because childless ¯lers are included in the sample. Among returns
with a dependent exemption for a child living at home, 82% of the sample of unmarried ¯lers
and 65% of the sample of married ¯lers claim the EITC.
Taxpayers use Schedule C to report pro¯t or loss from a business organized as a sole propri-
etorship. Among returns in my sample ¯led by unmarried ¯lers, 5.7% report non-zero Schedule
17Late returns are substantially more likely to report self-employment income. Looking at returns ¯led up to
three years late and satisfying all the other restrictions used to create my sample, 20.2% of unmarried returns
and 43.5% of joint returns report non-zero self-employment income. Late returns also have a high propensity to
claim the EITC. In the same sample of late returns, 21.2% of unmarried returns and 38.9% of married returns
claim the EITC. This is surprising given the evidence in Slemrod et al. (1997) that those receiving refunds tend
to ¯le earlier than those who have a balance due and the evidence in Barrow and McGranahan (2000) that
EITC refunds peak earlier in the tax year than do other income tax refunds.
18For tax years 1984 to 1988, only returns with a ¯ling status of married ¯ling jointly or head of household could
claim the EITC. Eligibility was expanded to those with a ¯ling status of qualifying widower with dependents in
1989, and additionally to single ¯lers in 1991.
16C income. Among joint returns of married couples this ¯gure is 21.2%. The ¯gure is higher for
joint returns in part because the data indicate whether any member of the ¯ling unit earned self-
employment income, and on average those ¯ling jointly live in larger households. Although the
tax return itself does specify which individual earned any Schedule C income, this information
is not available in the public use dataset. The presence of Schedule C is not a perfect measure
of what is typically thought of as self-employment. In one sense, it is too broad. It includes as
self-employed people who may be \moonlighters," with very small amounts of self-employment
income. This appears to be the exception for the self-employed EITC recipients in my sample.
The mean amount of Schedule C income for these ¯lers is greater than $5000, and on average
Schedule C income accounts for 41% of AGI for unmarried ¯lers and 61% of AGI for married
¯lers. In other contexts, the presence of Schedule C as an indicator of self-employment has
been criticized as too narrow. It ignores income from other types of entrepreneurial activities,
such as partnership income, rents and royalties. I exclude these sources from my measure of
self-employment because they are not considered earned income for purposes of the EITC.
Ideally, I would like to compare the reporting of self-employment income by ¯ling units
with and without EITC qualifying children. Unfortunately the tax return does not report
the number of EITC qualifying children. The most similar item available is the number of
dependent exemptions claimed for children living at home. The criteria for an EITC qualifying
child are slightly di®erent from the criteria for a dependent.19 The residency test that must
be satis¯ed by an EITC-qualifying child mandates that a child live with the taxpayer for more
than half of the year. The dependent exemption de¯nition waives this requirement for certain
children. Conveniently, though, taxpayers must report separately the number of dependent
exemptions claimed for children living at home and for children living away from home. In
my analysis I classify a return as having EITC qualifying children if there are any dependent
exemptions for children at home. This method is not perfect. For example, the dependent
19Holtzblatt and McCubbin (2003) provide a detailed comparison of the criteria that must be met to claim
a child for each of ¯ve child-related provisions: the dependent exemption, head of household ¯ling status, the
child tax credit, the child and dependent care tax credit, and the EITC.
17exemption criteria include a support test|the taxpayer claiming the exemption must provide
more than half of the child's support|while the EITC has no support test. The challenge of
identifying those with EITC-qualifying children explains why Figure 1 shows, for years before
1994, slightly di®erent values for all EITC recipients and for EITC recipients with children,
even though no EITC was available to individuals without qualifying children.20
Some simple descriptive statistics are consistent with the hypothesis that the structure
of the EITC a®ects reported self-employment income. The incentive to report positive self-
employment income is greatest in the phase-in region and least in the phase-out region. Table
2 shows that those with real wage income under $9000 are more likely to report positive self-
employment income than are those with real wage income above $14000. 7.4% of unmarried
¯lers in the lowest income category report positive self-employment income, versus 1.8% in
the highest income category. Although not shown in the table, the decline in the reporting of
self-employment income is more pronounced when the sample is restricted to EITC recipients.
Among unmarried EITC recipients, the share reporting positive self-employment income falls
from 13.6% in the lowest-income category to 1.9% in the middle category and to 1.2% in the
highest income category.
4 Results
Before presenting the main regression results, I demonstrate how the reporting of Schedule C
income a®ects the dollar value of EITC payments. All values are expressed in real 1998 dollars.
For each EITC recipient, I impute the value of the credit that would be received based on
earnings exclusive of net Schedule C income (that is, wage and salary income only). I assume
that the number of EITC qualifying children is equal to the number of exemptions for children
living at home. In the ¯rst column of Table 3 I compare the imputed credit without Schedule
C income to the actual credit received. By design these two credit amounts will di®er due to
20In my dataset the share of EITC recipients who have zero exemptions for children living at home is between
3.8% and 5.5% in each year from 1984 to 1993.
18reported self-employment income. In addition, these credit amounts will di®er if the number of
EITC qualifying children does not equal the number of exemptions for children at home, or if a
¯ler claimed the additional health insurance credit that was brie°y part of the EITC in the early
1990s. As an alternative comparison, I predict the credit amount based on reported earnings
including Schedule C.21 Comparisons of predicted credit amounts with and without Schedule C
income are shown in the second column of Table 3. The only source of di®erence between these
two amounts is reported self-employment income. Looking across all EITC recipients, both
columns show that reported self-employment income has little e®ect on the credit received
for the majority. Restricting attention to EITC recipients with Schedule C income, however,
shows that a large majority of these ¯lers bene¯t from reporting their self-employment income.
About 70% see their credit increase by $10 or more due to their reported self-employment
income. Among all EITC recipients with Schedule C income, the mean credit change from
reporting self-employment income is an increase of approximately $650. The median change is
an increase of just over $300. These increases are substantial relative to the average real EITC
payment of $1075. Both the share enjoying a gain and the average amount of additional credit
due to reported Schedule C income are virtually identical across ¯lers who do and do not use
a paid preparer.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the di®erence-in-di®erence equation for a sample
of low-income, unmarried tax ¯lers. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the tax
return shows positive Schedule C income. Marginal e®ects from probit regressions, evaluated
at the mean, are shown in the table, with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use
weights provided by the IRS. The ¯rst column includes returns with real wage income less than
$9000. The second column includes returns with real wage income between $9000 and $14000,
while the third column includes returns with real wage income between $14000 and $30095.
The columns can be thought of as roughly corresponding to the three regions of the EITC.
21In most cases there is little di®erence between the predicted and actual credit amounts. On average, the
actual credit is $12 greater than the predicted credit. The prediction method is least accurate in 1991-1993,
when a larger credit could be claimed by those who paid for health insurance covering a qualifying child. Over
these three years, the actual credit is $89 larger than the predicted credit on average.
19The coe±cients of greatest interest in this table are the three interaction terms. Each of these
shows the di®erence in the growth of self-employment across ¯lers with and without children, all
relative to the base period of 1984-86. Consistent with the incentives generated by the EITC,
there is some evidence that EITC expansions increase the reporting of self-employment income
in the phase-in region and reduce it in the phase-out region. For ¯lers in the lowest income
category, there is no evidence that the 1987 or 1991 EITC expansions caused the reporting of
self-employment to evolve di®erently among those with and without children. However, the
1994 expansion is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the reporting of positive
Schedule C income among those with children relative to those without children. This value
is signi¯cant economically as well as statistically. Averaging over all years of my sample, only
7.4% of unmarried ¯lers with wage income under $9000 report positive self-employment income,
so an increase of 3.2 percentage points represents a 43% change. For ¯lers in the middle income
category, self-employment rates evolve similarly for those with and without children. For ¯lers
in the highest income category, each of the EITC expansions is associated with a signi¯cant
reduction in the reporting of self-employment income, relative to the base period. In each case,
the reduction is less than 1 percentage point in magnitude.
Many of the other variables included in Table 4 have sensible e®ects on the reporting
of Schedule C income. The coe±cients on the three period variables are highly signi¯cant,
and indicate that the share of unmarried returns reporting self-employment income is gener-
ally rising over time. No clear pattern emerges in the relationship between unemployment
and self-employment. The hypothesis that a high unemployment rate pushes people into self-
employment receives support in the lowest wage category, but in the mid-wage category higher
unemployment rates are associated with lower self-employment rates. The two variables related
to state welfare policies should be most relevant for the lowest-income ¯lers, but in fact have
little explanatory power for any of the three groups. The presence of a work requirement as
part of a pre-1996 welfare waiver has no signi¯cant e®ect on self-employment. Surprisingly,
allowing self-employment to satisfy a work requirement after the 1996 reform is associated with
20lower self-employment rates for those in the lowest income category.
A ¯ler who can be claimed as a dependent is ineligible for the EITC. Dependent status is
not available in the ¯rst three years of my data. In subsequent years, dependents account for
about one-third of the low-wage unmarried sample, 8% of the mid-wage unmarried sample, and
1% of the high-wage unmarried sample. As a robustness check, I exclude the ¯rst three years
of data and restrict my sample to non-dependent ¯lers. I again estimate di®erence-in-di®erence
equations, treating the 1987-1990 period as the baseline. The pattern of results is similar to
that seen in Table 4. There is no evidence that the 1991 EITC expansion caused the reporting
of self-employment income to evolve di®erently among those with and without children. For
those with wage income less than $9000, the 1994 expansion is associated with a signi¯cant
4.3 percentage point increase in the reporting of self-employment income among those with
children relative to those without.
Results for joint returns of married couples are shown in Table 5. I drop the two variables
related to state welfare policies, because very few married couples are eligible for AFDC or
TANF. Otherwise, the speci¯cation is the same as that used for unmarried ¯lers. As was the
case for unmarried ¯lers, there is evidence of a substantial response to the most recent EITC
expansion. Among those with real wage income less than $9000, the 1994 expansion is associated
with a signi¯cant 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability of reporting positive Schedule
C income. None of the EITC expansions are associated with signi¯cant changes in the reporting
of self-employment income among those in the mid- or high-income groups.
A comparison of tables 4 and 5 shows that state unemployment rates and the presence of
children a®ect the reporting of self-employment income di®erently for married and unmarried
¯lers. For married ¯lers the unemployment rate is consistently negatively correlated with self-
employment. This lends support to the \pull" hypothesis that self-employment is a more
attractive option in a stronger economy. Among married ¯lers there is more evidence that the
presence of children is associated with a higher probability of reporting self-employment income.
This is consistent with the work of Broussard et al. (2006) who suggest that the self-employed
21have more children with the hopes of passing the family business down to the next generation.
In two robustness checks, I augment the basic di®erence-in-di®erence equation with a set of
state dummies and with state-speci¯c time trends. Neither one of these modi¯cations changes
the pattern of coe±cients on the interaction terms. The observed self-employment reporting
decisions are again broadly consistent with incentives. Both unmarried and married ¯lers
with the lowest levels of wage income responded to the 1994 EITC expansion with signi¯cant
increases in the probability of reporting self-employment income. For unmarried ¯lers, the
magnitude of this e®ect is about 3 percentage points. For married ¯lers, the point estimate is
as large as 6 percentage points when state ¯xed e®ects are included. Among unmarried ¯lers
with real wage income between $14000 and $30095 there is evidence of signi¯cant but small
(0.5 to 0.8 percentage point) declines in the reporting of positive self-employment income after
each of the EITC expansions.
Like the rest of the tax code, the EITC provisions are complex. The typical taxpayer may
not have a complete or accurate understanding of how the EITC a®ects the tax implications
of reporting self-employment income. Paid preparers, however, should fully understand the
incentives generated by the EITC. I expect the pattern of increased reported self-employment
in the lowest-income group and reduced reported self-employment in the highest-income group
to be more pronounced among ¯lers who use a paid preparer. I have estimated Equation 1
separately for those who do and do not use a paid preparer. Information on paid preparer
use is missing from the 1985, 1989, and 1990 tax ¯les, and so I drop these three years in this
analysis.22 The coe±cients from the key interaction terms are shown in Table 6. The results
are mixed. Among both unmarried and married ¯lers, the predicted increase in reported self-
employment within the lowest-wage group is driven entirely by ¯lers who do not use a paid
preparer. In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that the use of a paid
preparer is an endogenous choice made by the taxpayer. Perhaps taxpayers who intend to
overstate their self-employment income avoid going to a paid preparer. The predicted decrease
22Excluding these three years and estimating the regressions for ¯lers pooled together regardless of paid
preparer use generates results that are very similar to Tables 4 and 5.
22in reported self-employment within the highest-income group is evident among unmarried ¯lers
who use a paid preparer. Overall, Table 6 does not show compelling evidence that paid preparers
are advising their clients to report self-employment income in such a way as to maximize the
amount of credit received. This is consistent with the ¯nding of Chetty and Saez (2009) that
about half of the paid preparers in a large-scale ¯eld experiment at H&R Block encouraged
EITC recipients to work more regardless of the EITC region into which they fell.
In a set of regressions not shown, I change the dependent variable to an indicator for report-
ing negative Schedule C income. The structure of the EITC suggests that credit expansions
should reduce the reporting of negative self-employment income in the phase-in region and in-
crease this reporting in the phase-out region. The regression results show that the reporting of
negative Schedule C income is largely insensitive to EITC expansions. Most of the interaction
terms are insigni¯cant and very close to zero. There is some evidence that married ¯lers with
the lowest levels of wage income responded to the two more recent expansions with a reduction
in the likelihood of reporting negative self-employment income. The 1991 expansion is associ-
ated with a 0.8 percentage point decline and the 1994 expansion with a 1.2 percentage point
decline in the probability of reporting negative Schedule C income, both signi¯cant at the 5%
level.
Table 7 shows the results of linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the real
dollar amount of net self-employment income reported on Schedule C. These regressions are
estimated for the full sample, so the dependent variable can take on positive, zero, and negative
values. These regressions show that the most recent EITC expansion is associated with an
increase in the dollar amount of Schedule C income reported by taxpayers with the lowest wage
income. For unmarried ¯lers with real wage income less than $9000, the 1994 expansion is
associated with a signi¯cant $456 increase in self-employment income among ¯lers with children
relative to childless ¯lers. For married ¯lers, the 1986 expansion is associated with a signi¯cant
$585 increase in reported self-employment income and the 1994 expansion is associated with
a signi¯cant $1789 increase in reported self-employment income. As predicted, there is no
23signi¯cant e®ect of EITC expansions on the amount of Schedule C income reported by those
with wage income between $9000 and $14000. The predicted negative e®ect for those in the
highest income category is evident only for unmarried ¯lers after the 1986 expansion, and for
this group the magnitude of the coe±cient is quite small. In the second panel of Table 7 I
restrict the sample to returns reporting positive Schedule C income. For unmarried ¯lers, none
of the coe±cients is statistically di®erent from zero. This suggests that the e®ect of the EITC on
reported Schedule C income is concentrated on the extensive margin (the decision to report any
Schedule C income) rather than on the intensive margin. For the lowest-income married ¯lers,
there is evidence that the 1994 EITC expansion was associated with an increase in reported
Schedule C income on the intensive margin.
Another way to investigate the sensitivity of reported self-employment income to tax incen-
tives is to compare the dollar amount of net Schedule C income actually reported to the dollar
amount that would maximize a ¯ler's EITC. The credit-maximizing amount of self-employment
income is the amount that would move a taxpayer to the nearest kink in the EITC schedule. It
is positive for taxpayers with wage income within the phase-in region of the EITC and negative
for those with wage income in the phase-out region of the EITC. Evidence from my sample
suggests a strong correlation between actual and credit-maximizing self-employment amounts.
Among all self-employed taxpayers in my sample, the correlation between the credit-maximizing
amount of self-employment income and the actual amount of self-employment income is 0.30.
Among EITC recipients in my sample, this correlation is 0.51. A regression of actual self-
employment income on the credit-maximizing amount and a constant, for EITC recipients,
yields a highly signi¯cant coe±cient of 0.69.
Beginning in 1991, the EITC phase-in rate and phase-out rate have been set at higher levels
for ¯lers with multiple children than for ¯lers with one child. As a robustness check, I restrict
my sample to ¯lers with at least one child, construct a new treatment group made up of those
with more than one child, and estimate di®erence-in-di®erence equations of the same form as
used previously. There should be no signi¯cant di®erence between those with one and with
24multiple children in response to the 1986 expansion, as the law had yet to distinguish between
the two groups. If Schedule C reporting decisions are sensitive to EITC parameters, ¯lers
with multiple children should demonstrate larger reactions in response to the 1991 and 1994
expansions. This pattern is evident for married ¯lers. Among those with wage income under
$9000, the probability of reporting positive Schedule C income increased by 7.9 percentage
points more for ¯lers with multiple children in response to the 1991 expansion and by 5.3
percentage points more in response to the 1994 expansion. While these coe±cients are large,
the share of low-wage married ¯lers with kids who report positive Schedule C income is also
quite large. Averaged over the entire sample period, this share is 44.9%. Regressions in which
the dependent variable is the real dollar amount of net Schedule C income also show larger
responses of married ¯lers with multiple children to the 1991 and 1994 expansions, but not
to the 1986 expansion. For unmarried ¯lers, the responses to EITC expansions never di®er
between those with one and those with multiple children. This may be partially due to small
sample sizes. While 27% of the married ¯lers in my sample have more than one child, only 8%
of unmarried ¯lers have multiple children.23
Results from an alternative speci¯cation that does not depend on a comparison of ¯lers
with and without children are shown in Table 8. Here, the sample is restricted to ¯lers with at
least one child and the incentive to report self-employment income is measured by the phase-in
rate. Variation in the phase-in rate comes from federal expansions, from di®ering treatment of
those with di®erent numbers of children, and from state-level EITC programs. The top panel of
the table reports marginal e®ects from probit regressions in which the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one for ¯lers who report positive Schedule C income. For both unmarried and
married ¯lers in the lowest income category, an increase in the phase-in rate is associated with
an increase in the probability of reporting positive self-employment income. A 10-point increase
23There is never any di®erence in the federal EITC parameters facing a ¯ler with two children and a ¯ler with
more than two children. As a placebo test, I restrict my sample to ¯lers with two or more children, construct
a treatment group consisting of those with at least three children, and again estimate di®erence-in-di®erence
equations. There is no evidence that ¯lers with two children and ¯lers with more than two children respond
di®erently to EITC expansions.
25in the phase-in rate, say from 15% to 25%, increases the probability of positive self-employment
income by 1.6 percentage points among unmarried ¯lers and by 4.1 percentage points among
married ¯lers. Between 1986 and 1996, the phase-in rate for a ¯ler with one child increased by
23 percentage points, from 11% to 34%. The implied increase in the self-employment rate is
3.7 percentage points for unmarried ¯lers and 9.4 percentage points for married ¯lers. While
these e®ects are large, they roughly match the trends shown in Figure 1. The second, third,
¯fth, and sixth columns of Table 8 consider ¯lers earning too much to be in the phase-in
region of the EITC. As expected, changes in the phase-in rate have no signi¯cant e®ect on the
reporting of self-employment income among these ¯lers. The bottom panel of Table 8 reports
marginal e®ects from regressions in which the dependent variable is the real dollar amount
of net Schedule C income. These regressions show that both unmarried and married ¯lers in
the lowest wage category respond to an increase in the phase-in rate by reporting more self-
employment income. A 10-point increase in the phase-in rate is associated with an additional
$152 of reported Schedule C income among unmarried ¯lers and an additional $851 of reported
Schedule C income among married ¯lers.
I have chosen to divide the sample into three groups, based on real wage income, that
approximate the three regions of the EITC. One problem with this approach is that wage
income is endogenous. Other studies have identi¯ed groups likely to be a®ected by the EITC
on the basis of more plausibly exogenous characteristics, such as education, as in Eissa and
Liebman (1996), and predicted wage, as in Ellwood (2000). A second problem is that the
cuto®s I use, $9000 and $14000, do not perfectly align with the cuto®s between the three
regions of the EITC. The use of tax return data prevents me from de¯ning groups on the basis
of demographic information. I can, however, check the sensitivity of my results to alternative
income-based de¯nitions of the three groups. I consider three alternatives. First, I replace
$9000 and $14000 with the most generous EITC cuto®s in place during a given year. That is,
I use the EITC cuto®s for ¯lers with qualifying children prior to 1994 and the cuto®s for ¯lers
with two or more children beginning in 1994. Second, I use the EITC cuto®s that applied to a
26¯ler with one qualifying child in each year. Third, I return to the cuto®s of $9000 and $14000,
but group returns on the basis of AGI rather than wage income. The results for unmarried
¯lers are robust to these changes. Within the lowest income group, however it is de¯ned,
the 1994 EITC expansion is associated with a signi¯cantly greater increase in the reporting
of self-employment income for unmarried ¯lers with children relative to childless ¯lers. The
magnitude of this di®erence-in-di®erence coe±cient varies from 2.1 percentage points to 4.4
percentage points. The results for married ¯lers are less consistent across speci¯cations. When
returns are grouped on the basis of AGI, none of the EITC expansions is associated with a
signi¯cant change in the reporting of self-employment income within the lowest-income group.
Within the middle income category, where the plateau shape of the EITC should have little
e®ect on reported self-employment, the most recent expansion is associated with a signi¯cant
and large increase in reported self-employment. Within the highest income category, all three
expansions are associated with signi¯cant increases in reported self-employment, even though
the EITC expansions increased the tax cost of reporting self-employment income for those in
the phase-out region.
5 Conclusion
The EITC subsidizes earnings of low-income individuals, treating earnings from wage work and
earnings from self-employment in the same way. The literature estimating the labor supply
e®ects of the credit has largely focused on the wage sector, and has found substantial increases
in the labor force participation rate of single mothers in response to EITC expansions. In
this paper I use tax return data from 1984 to 1998 to investigate how EITC expansions have
in°uenced the reporting of self-employment income to the IRS.
I use a di®erence-in-di®erence strategy similar to what has previously been used in the EITC
literature. I compare changes in the reporting of self-employment income across ¯lers with
and without children. Those with children face larger changes in the incentive to report self-
27employment income as a result of EITC expansions. I ¯nd that the most recent EITC expansion,
e®ective in 1994, is associated with a signi¯cant increase in the reporting of positive self-
employment income by the lowest-income ¯lers. Relative to tax years 1984-1986, the probability
of reporting positive self-employment income increases by 3.2 percentage points more among
unmarried ¯lers with children than among unmarried ¯lers without children. For married
¯lers, the corresponding increase is 4.1 percentage points. This behavior is consistent with the
increase in the e®ective subsidy these taxpayers faced for reporting additional earnings. In an
alternative strategy that does not rely on comparing ¯lers with and without children, I ¯nd
that increases in the phase-in rate are associated with increased reporting of self-employment
income among both married and unmarried taxpayers with the lowest levels of income.
Using unaudited tax return data makes it di±cult to draw any conclusions about how EITC
expansions a®ect the accuracy of reported self-employment income. The increased reporting of
self-employment income that I ¯nd for the lowest-income ¯lers could correspond to improved
compliance, if taxpayers have begun to report some income that previously would have gone
unreported. If reported and actual self-employment income have increased together, compliance
is unchanged. Finally, compliance may have worsened if individuals have begun to report
more self-employment income than they have actually earned. Steuerle (1991) has dubbed this
scenario the \superterranean economy." A comparison of the reporting patterns present in tax
return data to patterns of self-employment activity present in survey data might shed light on
the compliance question. I leave this avenue open for future research.
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31Table 1: EITC Parameters in Four Time Periods
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
1984-86 1987-90 1991-93 1994-98
Average Number of Recipient Households (1000s) 6988 11031 14293 19496
Maximum Credit, One Child 812 1202 1529 2249
Maximum Credit, No Children 0 0 0 338
Maximum Phase-in Rate, One Child (Percent) 11 14 18.5 34
Maximum Phase-out Rate, One Child (Percent) 12.5 10 13.21 15.98
Note: Data on the number of recipients are from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division.
Data on EITC parameters are from the Green Book of the House Ways and Means Committee. Maximum



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 3: Changes in Credit Amount Due to Reported Schedule C Income
Compared to Actual Credit Compared to Predicted Credit
Share of All EITC Recipients
j Change j < $10 66.8 87.5
Increase ¸ $10 18.2 9.3
Decrease ¸ $10 15.0 3.2
Share of EITC Recipients with Schedule C Income
j Change j < $10 3.0 5.9
Increase ¸ $10 70.5 69.9
Decrease ¸ $10 26.5 24.3
Mean Dollar Change in Credit
All Recipients with Schedule C 640 656
Gainers 1111 1102
Losers -540 -472
Median Dollar Change in Credit
All Recipients with Schedule C 324 310
Gainers 766 748
Losers -351 -292
Note: The actual credit amount is equal to the sum of three variables in the SOI data: the credit used to
o®set income tax, the credit used to o®set any other tax liability, and the refundable portion of the credit. The
predicted credit is calculated by applying the relevant EITC parameters to the EITC income reported in the
SOI data. All amounts are expressed in real 1998 dollars.
34Table 4: Reporting of Positive Schedule C Income, Unmarried Filers
Wage<9K 9K<Wage<14K 14K<Wage<30K
Kids 0.034¤¤¤ -0.002 0.0003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Period2 0.008¤¤¤ 0.004 0.005¤¤¤
(1987-1990) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Interact2 -0.003 0.0002 -0.008¤¤¤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
Period3 0.018¤¤¤ 0.012¤¤¤ 0.010¤¤¤
(1991-1993) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Interact3 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008¤¤¤
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Period4 0.026¤¤¤ 0.007¤¤¤ 0.009¤¤¤
(1994-1996) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Interact4 0.032¤¤¤ -0.0001 -0.005¤¤
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
Unemp Rate 0.002¤¤¤ -0.001¤¤ -0.00005
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Work Requirement, Pre-96 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
SE Satis¯es Work Req, Post-96 -0.009¤¤¤ 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 137570 34567 73184
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if positive Schedule C income is reported. The table
reports marginal e®ects from probit regressions, evaluated at the mean. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Sample weights are used in all regressions.
35Table 5: Reporting of Positive Schedule C Income, Married Filers
Wage<9K 9K<Wage<14K 14K<Wage<30K
Kids 0.135¤¤¤ 0.041¤¤ 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.007)
Period2 0.007 -0.013¤ 0.012
(1987-1990) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008)
Interact2 0.007 0.022 0.004
(0.020) (0.022) (0.010)
Period3 0.043¤¤¤ 0.056¤¤¤ 0.031¤¤¤
(1991-1993) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009)
Interact3 -0.029 -0.030 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010)
Period4 0.011 0.019 0.027¤¤¤
(1994-1996) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008)
Interact4 0.041¤¤ 0.004 0.004
(0.020) (0.019) (0.009)
Unemp Rate -0.013¤¤¤ -0.012¤¤¤ -0.005¤¤¤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
N 20991 11678 34354
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if positive Schedule C income is reported. The table
reports marginal e®ects from probit regressions, evaluated at the mean. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Sample weights are used in all regressions.
36Table 6: Reporting of Positive Schedule C Income, By Paid Preparer Use
Unmarried Filers Married Filers
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
A. No Paid Preparer
Interact2 -0.0003 0.003 -0.004 0.019 0.066 -0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.038 (0.048) (0.013)
Interact3 0.016¤ 0.003 -0.006¤¤ 0.026 -0.0007 0.001
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.034) (0.029) (0.014)
Interact4 0.057¤¤¤ 0.003 -0.002 0.088¤¤¤ 0.064¤¤ 0.003
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003) (0.037) (0.036) (0.013)
N 56821 16732 35395 5633 3387 11245
B. Paid Preparer
Interact2 0.010 -0.006 -0.016¤¤ 0.002 0.008 0.022
(0.019) (0.016) (0.006) (0.039) (0.045) (0.023)
Interact3 -0.054¤¤¤ -0.017 -0.015¤¤ -0.072¤¤ -0.082¤¤ -0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017)
Interact4 -0.022 -0.011 -0.015¤¤ -0.00001 -0.065¤ -0.005
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017)
N 54481 10941 22459 11792 6191 16114
Note: This table reports a subset of the marginal e®ects from probit regressions in which the dummy variable
is equal to 1 if positive Schedule C income is reported. The full set of regressors used here is the same as the
set reported in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample weights are used in all regressions.
The paid preparer variable is not available for tax years 1985, 1989, and 1990. Observations from these years
are dropped from the regressions reported above.
37Table 7: Dollar Amount of Schedule C Income Reported
Unmarried Filers Married Filers
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
A. Full Sample
Interact2 -14 -20 -36¤¤¤ 585¤¤ 133 -42
(85) (22) (13) (239) (181) (66)
Interact3 5 -5 -17 262 -36 1
(84) (20) (13) (243) (169) (67)
Interact4 456¤¤¤ 16 -10 1789¤¤¤ 156 13
(81) (18) (12) (230) (161) (62)
N 137570 34567 73184 53090 11678 34354
B. Returns with Positive Schedule C Income
Interact2 114 -197 -267 436 174 -211
(678) (864) (490) (476) (844) (438)
Interact3 309 613 -184 -118 1118 257
(642) (825) (473) (483) (782) (428)
Interact4 297 706 -196 1073¤¤ 893 -51
(586) (727) (429) (435) (743) (404)
N 18523 1571 2377 18435 2884 5779
Note: The dependent variable is amount of net Schedule C income reported, in real 1998 dollars. The table
reports marginal e®ects from OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample weights are used in
all regressions.
38Table 8: Using Variation in Phase-In Rate, Filers with Children Only
Unmarried Filers Married Filers
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
A. Dep Var = 1 if Any Positive Schedule C Income
Phase-In Rate 0.016¤¤¤ -0.002 -0.001 0.041¤¤¤ 0.006 0.004
(in 10s) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Time 0.003¤¤¤ 0.001 0.0006¤ -0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Unemp Rate -0.003¤ -0.001 -0.0001 -0.017¤¤¤ -0.017¤¤¤ -0.007¤¤¤
(0.0016) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Work Requirement, -0.012 -0.006 -0.001
Pre-96 (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
SE Satis¯es Work -0.0003 -0.002 0.003
Req, Post-96 (0.011) (0.005) (0.004)
N 17335 9649 20861 16399 5856 21277
B. Dep Var = Net Schedule C Income
Phase-In Rate 151.6¤¤¤ -0.8 1.2 851.4¤¤¤ 135.3 59.6¤¤
(in 10s) (49.7) (11.7) (5.1) (150.6) (84.2) (24.7)
Time 20.0 1.9 -0.7 -57.8 -27.6 -10.5
(12.6) (2.8) (1.5) (38.4) (21.6) (6.4)
Unemp Rate -36.6¤¤ 5.5¤ 0.8 -243.1¤¤¤ -134.0¤¤¤ -18.7¤¤
(16.1) (3.2) (1.9) (46.5) (28.5) (7.3)
Work Requirement, -194.9¤ 7.7 11.6
Pre-96 (104.1) (22.3) (12.8)
SE Satis¯es Work -34.4 48.9 -6.7
Req, Post-96 (156.1) (35.8) (16.5)
N 17335 9649 20861 16399 5856 21277
Note: The sample is restricted to returns claiming at least one dependent exemption for a child living at home.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if positive Schedule C income is reported. The table reports
marginal e®ects from probit regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Sample weights are used in all
regressions.
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Note: The sample is restricted to tax returns with real AGI between $1 and $30095, with real wage income
less than $30095, and with a ¯ling status other than married ¯ling separately. Late returns are excluded. Self-
employment income is de¯ned as Schedule C income. Vertical lines show years in which EITC expansions were
passed, and each expansion is e®ective in the following year.
40Figure 2: Change in Tax Liability from Reporting $500 of Self-Employment Income, Di®erence
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Note: I used TAXSIM to compute how a ¯ler's tax liability would change if she reported $500 of real self-
employment income, starting at various levels of wage income. This table shows the di®erence between the
change in tax liability for an unmarried ¯ler with one dependent child and the change in tax liability for an
unmarried ¯ler with zero dependents. All dollar amounts are in real 1998 dollars. Negative dollar amounts
represent reductions in tax liability (equivalently, increases in refundable credits).
41